01:40:07 · David Senra, Luca Ferrari
[01:40:07] S0: Yeah. Buffett and Munger were both saying, this is [01:40:11] S1: where we got these ideas from. If I have to think about all the people who did exceptional things in business and investing, if I had to take their achievement and assuming we can quantify it and divide it by their level of popularity, or just not meaning they are liked or disliked, but how well known they are, it would be at the top of the rank. He's been one of the most successful investors and business people ever by any measure, and yet very few people know him, actually. I think if you ask 100 people, even in business, 95 will now know who he was.
01:40:42 · David Senra
[01:40:42] S0: One of the things that Buffett and Singleton had in common is they essentially primarily saw their job as they were the ones to allocate capital. Their main talent was capital allocation. Singleton, I think you might have said this, and I could be wrong, this is what I'm going ask you. After he stopped acquiring companies, right, he bought, like, a 160 in ten years, something like that. I forgot the number... Exact number. And then he's like, oh, now we're gonna reverse course. We're not gonna... He he didn't make another acquisition... Material acquisition for the rest of his career. And then he just focused on capital allocation, improving the business unit he's had, and then just discovering, like, where's the best dollar I could spend? And is it improving operation of this company? Is it buying another company? And then he discovered it... I was actually buying back his own shares. Yeah. So I think I heard you say before that out of all the investment opportunities you see in the future, it might be buying back Bending Spoons shares.
01:41:31 · Luca Ferrari
[01:41:31] S1: Yeah. Not imminently. I think we see a runway. Right now, allocating capital toward acquisitions is is... Has been an expected to continue being way too... Like, returns, I think, will be way too appealing for that that not to be the the priority. But I think if you ask me, in the very long run, that could be an appealing way of of creating shareholder value. I I think what what Singleton did incredibly well, it was acutely aware of the circumstances and boundary conditions, and very creative and made fully rational decisions. For a decade or more, even the market was affording its stock a good multiple, and it was aggregating a lot of businesses, it was buying at a lower multiple. And it was on top of that exploiting the arbitrage, also very astute at selecting those businesses, kind of double dipped business that was undervalued regardless, people didn't see the potential in the medium to long term. I'd add to that the fact that that business would then join a conglomerate with a higher multiple, so double value creation. And then later, the market changed its preferences as the markets often do, so you've got to stay open minded about it, and started appreciating more vertical businesses. And so he worked on improving those businesses and spinning them off so they could be maximally appreciated. So he was never opinionated on opinionated on the on the how this should be done. He just looked... I believe... I've never met him, of course, but I I believe that looked at investing and running a business as as a puzzle and try to find the best solution. He was also a great engineer. Like, he he could have been one of the best engineers that he wanted to pursue that, and almost a grandmaster in chess, I believe, where he listened to. He had played
01:43:16 · David Senra, Luca Ferrari
[01:43:16] S0: chess blindfolded. There's a story in that, I think, the episode he just did where he's, like, playing with his back turned. And he goes, hold on. You told me the wrong move. Three moves again. I mean, he's obviously genius of IQ. Charlie Munger's on record saying he was the smartest single human he ever met in his entire life. And imagine all the people that Munger met in his entire life. Singleton took Teledyne public almost immediately. Did you know when you started Bending Spoons and you're like, okay, we're not going to stick with one company, we're going keep acquiring, started having you did really small acquisitions, they were successful, you kept on that path. Was the plan for you and your co founders like this is going be a public company one day? [01:43:50] S1: I'd say when we talked about public versus private, I think more often than not, we thought this would at some point be a public company. There are advantages and disadvantages in being a public company. I'd say for most companies, the advantages greater than the disadvantages. And for a company like Bending Spoons that requires capital to grow fast, I think the advantages are way too large. I mean, it's not really a discussion that you should be public. But yes, it's not all roses, obviously there are new pressures and incentives and noise that you'd be better off without for sure. [01:44:22] S0: How long it lasts when, okay, we know we're going go public to you actually went public?
01:44:22 · David Senra, Luca Ferrari
[01:44:22] S0: How long it lasts when, okay, we know we're going go public to you actually went public? [01:44:26] S1: We like to make decisions as late as possible. I think that procrastination is awesome if it doesn't come from laziness. Because if you postpone decisions, you often have more information when you actually get to make them. [01:44:42] S0: Singleton said something like this, where he's like, if you don't make a decision, in many cases, it resolves itself. Yeah. So it removes the need to make a decision.
01:44:50 · Luca Ferrari
[01:44:50] S1: It's a slightly different thing. It's not a reason why... It's a subset of what I said, meaning... So there are some decisions that there is... The only advantage of making them now is that you can forget about them. So there's something to say about that. And I think if the decision is not particularly important, sometimes the moment you bring it up, just make it so that, you know, you can free up your RAM to to to tackle other tasks. But if the decision is so critical as to whether you should be a public company or not, or whether you want to buy a company or another, generally speaking, you're better off delaying it as much as possible, or at least there's almost no cost to delaying it other than the slight discomfort that you know it's still on your shelf, you need to still need to make it. And there are advantages, or at least no... I mean, worst case scenario, you'll be just as well off when you eventually make it as you were early. But often you have more information. Maybe, as we're just saying, the boundary conditions shift and you just don't need to make it any longer because it's irrelevant. Maybe you have made a decision one way, but then as the world changes or you learn something else that you had failed to spot earlier, you end up with a different option. And so with the IPO, we decided relatively early, probably something like first half of twenty twenty five, that we would want to prepare to go public in the near to medium term, so probably late twenty five, mid twenty six, late twenty six. But we would delay the decision as to whether actually to pull the trigger to as late as possible in the process. So we knew that we were probably gonna be a public company at some point, I'd say, certainly by late twenty five, no doubt about it. But we we didn't know if we would go public necessarily in in early July twenty six. We just said, okay, let's get ready and then we'll see. I think the definitive decision of, okay, we will go public as soon as possible, definitively, we made that decision in the spring of twenty six.