The Big Tech Show
00:03:08 · Barry Ward
[00:03:08] S4: Yes. I think it is sometimes justifiable. I hold privacy as something that's really, really important, but I don't think anybody has the right to expect absolute privacy just as you don't in the context even of your home. And your home is protected by the constitution, but there are circumstances in which the state can get a warrant to search your home, for example. That currently covers computers and phones as well. And the old legislation from 1993, the interception of postal packets is out of date. No two ways about it. And so, yes, there are circumstances, and it is for the... It is for a general good, and it is it is one of those circumstances where that common good outweighs your personal right to absolute privacy. That said, I would not want to see some of the stuff you see going on in America going on here where you have whole scale scanning of, Internet traffic or communications traffic, searching for keywords, then identifying people who might be problematic for one reason or another without the benefit of an intervention force to actually monitor whether that's necessary or not because that is a wholesale and, I think, unwarranted invasion
00:04:12 · Adrian Weckler, Barry Ward
[00:04:12] S5: of people. So the argument that is put forward for not breaking encryption is that once you dilute it or break or break it, it's kind of a binary thing. That once you break it, it opens the door for bad guys to get in. We're now potentially on the wave of AI hacking, to to come. And we've had this idea in Europe where privacy has been a sacrosanct thing. We've championed it for for a long while. Wouldn't it be a huge risk to break encryption? Like, we're talking about services like WhatsApp and iMessage here. [00:04:47] S4: Well, firstly, I don't agree that it's a binary thing that you either can break encrypt or you you can't. You can allow certain services to intercept communications, break encryption, and read the information that's in there under very controlled circumstances.
00:04:47 · Barry Ward, Adrian Weckler
[00:04:47] S4: Well, firstly, I don't agree that it's a binary thing that you either can break encrypt or you you can't. You can allow certain services to intercept communications, break encryption, and read the information that's in there under very controlled circumstances. [00:05:03] S5: Can we just clarify what we're talking about here? Because under the proposed EU law, which has been changed recently in recent recent months. The idea there was essentially that, networks like WhatsApp would have an obligation to do more monitoring of their own traffic, and that would include encrypted content on on messages. Now WhatsApp and iMessage and all these have long said they cannot actually see the content of those message because they're encrypted. You... They can see things like who sent a message, that type of metadata. But if you break the encryption, then you're essentially handing backdoor keys to somebody else. Now maybe what you're talking about is the right, for example, to hack a phone so that maybe you you get the credentials, the password, and the username. They do that. That happens all the time. That happens in The States. That happens in The UK. I think it's happened in Ireland, before. But are you saying that you think that if the guards presented a case that encryption itself, as The UK has done, as The US has done, this has been a long running battle between states and tech companies, that you still would think that the general principle of encryption should be... It shouldn't be absolute. Well,
00:06:26 · Barry Ward, Adrian Weckler
[00:06:26] S4: the first thing is that I do have faith in the ability of the state and the state actors, be it the guards or a security service, whatever it might be, to act within the law and to act responsibly. Now I think the law has been diluted so much when you talk about America. The, you know, the whole land security legislation that was passed in America is, I think, absolutely anathema to the notion the state acts responsible... Responsibility, but that doesn't happen here. The EU discussion around the the chat control proposal, I think so they call it, which I think is a really unfortunate name because it's not about controlling chat. It is about identifying where certain criminality is being facilitated through certain communications. Now if you say, for example, if we break encryption, then everybody can look at everybody's messages. It doesn't have to go there. And one of the issues that I have is that the approach to this so far has been about putting the obligation onto the platform owners like Signal. I mean, I mean, you listen to to Meredith Whittaker talking. [00:07:26] S5: President of Signal. [00:07:26] S4: Yeah. And I totally understand why she doesn't want it because it goes to the root of what their product is. But you can't place the obligation for national security on corporate interests because those two things don't always align.
00:07:26 · Barry Ward, Adrian Weckler, S2
[00:07:26] S4: Yeah. And I totally understand why she doesn't want it because it goes to the root of what their product is. But you can't place the obligation for national security on corporate interests because those two things don't always align. [00:07:39] S5: You mentioned Meredith Whittaker. So this is another thing that Meredith Whittaker, who we've had on this podcast a couple of times, has said and Tim Cook has said. Tim Cook came into this building, about just over ten years ago. He gave a series of interviews with us. And one of the things I was asking him about then was encryption because at the time, the UK government... I think it was under Cameron, David Cameron, who was the latest, effort by our sovereign government to get them to break iMessage because they wanted to be able to get in to see what bad guys were doing. The US does that all all the time or they seek that all the time. And Tim Cook told us that if The UK forced him to do that, he would pull iMessage from The UK. Yeah. Signal has said if something like EU chat control were to go forward in its unadulterated form, they would pull Signal from the EU. So, like, that... That's kinda hardball. And I have to say, up until this point, the states have backed down. [00:08:38] S2: Yeah. They have. Tried this three [00:08:40] S5: or four times, and every time, they've backed down.
00:08:40 · Adrian Weckler, Barry Ward
[00:08:40] S5: or four times, and every time, they've backed down. [00:08:42] S4: And it's really regrettable. I mean, the notion... You're right. It's hardball. And at the end of the day, we've got to decide who actually runs decisions around the security of nations in Europe, for example. Is it our national government, or is it a corporate interest? [00:08:55] S5: Then if we were so convinced that the the population or the electorate, for example, was on our side, why didn't we let them leave?