The Twenty Minute VC (20VC): Venture Capital | Startup Funding | The Pitch
00:29:51 · Harry Stebbings, David Morehead
[00:29:51] S1: As venture eats more and more of the world with your OpenAI's, your Anthropix, your SpaceX, your biggest companies in the world are being venture backed companies. Do you maybe feel that you need more in venture, more in tech? Does it change how you view the world? Does the mindset change? [00:30:07] S0: No, I feel pretty comfortable with where we stand. I think our biggest allocation is in growth equity on the private side. And we feel pretty comfortable with our capability and the manager set that we have there. [00:30:19] S1: Why do you like growth equity? Because of the returns timeline profile. [00:30:23] S0: The return timeline, there's also fewer zeros, and so that kind of goes to the value bit. I mean, it's just simple math. If there are fewer zeros, then everything else doesn't have to cover for the things that don't work, which is what helps get you to like, I think that their book is like annualizing it like 30% on sort of like the growth equity side. So that obviously meets our eight, 9% bogey. So I don't even actually know that I've ever had that question before. [00:30:51] S1: How do you think about like Mulligan vintages across Venture and Pete, Mulligan being like not very good vintages. A lot of people are talking about kind of 2122 for Venture and Pee being just like very bad vintages. We all just kind of went crazy. It was COVID. Sorry, Mayor Culper. And you've got now Toma Bravo. Obviously, had Medallia, which is obviously quite a well known return the keys situation.
00:30:51 · Harry Stebbings, David Morehead
[00:30:51] S1: How do you think about like Mulligan vintages across Venture and Pete, Mulligan being like not very good vintages. A lot of people are talking about kind of 2122 for Venture and Pee being just like very bad vintages. We all just kind of went crazy. It was COVID. Sorry, Mayor Culper. And you've got now Toma Bravo. Obviously, had Medallia, which is obviously quite a well known return the keys situation. [00:31:13] S0: I think that just kind of comes with the territory, right? I mean like basically what we do is we say, this is the amount that's gonna be in privates. And then we say, we're gonna allocate to PE expansion capital and VC, we're gonna do it in these sectors, and then I let the ladies have at it, and they come up with a portfolio and it had... The portfolio overall has sort of an expected return hurdle that they need to clear. If they're not clearing it, then that's a problem. If they are clearing it, then that works great. [00:31:44] S1: What are the annual liquidity requirements that, like... Obviously, as an endowment, you mentioned some of the... You're paying for tuition, really important. What are the annual requirements in terms of liquidity for you?
00:31:54 · David Morehead
[00:31:54] S0: Well, it's on a couple of fronts, like obviously on the distribution side, that's something that we can't get around, right? And that's about 5% on an annual basis. And so that dollar amount that keeps going up, which we want it to, right? Like that is the thing that pays for scholarships and professorships, etc. The sort of like subjective side, so let's call that like the objective side of the liquidity equation. On the subjective side of the liquidity equation is sort of like what capital do you need to have around to allocate to the next thing that's going to go up 20%, 30%. So we talked to our newer analysts about this and we say like what do you think the odds are that we find something to be up 20 sometime in the next four years? Like anything, anywhere. And they're like, wow, really high. And we're like, great. So then cash is worth 5% a year apart from what you're gonna earn on cash. So if cash is earning three and a half percent plus 5%, so opportunity cost, cash you is worth eight and a half percent. So if we find things to do that are north of that, then we do it. And if there's a period in the market sort of like seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, where we're not finding things to do in that ballpark, then we let cash get larger. So we kind of came into the pandemic with sort of 15, 16% in cash because we were looking around and we're like, I don't see something to do. And so our cash balance is sort of indicative of what we're seeing to do to make money.
00:33:28 · Harry Stebbings, David Morehead
[00:33:28] S1: Very difficult to keep your head of when everyone else is losing theirs. It's a brilliant Rudyard Kipling poem, but it's very difficult to do when momentum and excitement kicks in. Takes one discipline. [00:33:39] S0: Interestingly, in this period, this... So in the seventeen, eighteen, nineteen kind of cycle, we weren't finding other things to do. This time, we actually are finding stuff to do. And so we've actually kept our cash balances pretty low because we keep finding, you know, 20, 30% annualized things to do. And so our cash balances just end up being a function of, like, you know, what the environment is. [00:34:02] S1: I think one learns a lot from their mistakes if you are reflective. When you look at allocation decisions, what's an allocation mistake that comes to mind first? And and how do you reflect on it and learn from it?
00:34:02 · Harry Stebbings, David Morehead
[00:34:02] S1: I think one learns a lot from their mistakes if you are reflective. When you look at allocation decisions, what's an allocation mistake that comes to mind first? And and how do you reflect on it and learn from it? [00:34:14] S0: I can't come up with a specific example right off the top of my head, but I will say this, is that whenever you're trading, you for sure are going to lose money. And sometimes you're going to lose a lot of money. And sometimes you're going to lose a lot of money for a long period of time. And the takeaway from that, basically everyone goes through it. Everyone walks into the seat and thinks like that. It's not going to happen to me. This seems pretty easy. Sort of invariably you get kicked in the shins and then hit over the head by a two by four. And the takeaway from that is I never want to be all in. So things can always get worse. So when we're allocating to software in, you know, February, March of this year, we're not like drawing a line in the sand. We're like every available dollar is going into software, right? It's down 50, 60%. Like who's to say it's not going to be down 70, 80%? And so we set it up so that we're methodically and sort of mechanically allocating into difficult markets. And the reason we do that is to try to take the emotion, the psychology out of it. [00:35:18] S1: How do you literally do that? Methodically allocate into market?
00:35:18 · Harry Stebbings, David Morehead
[00:35:18] S1: How do you literally do that? Methodically allocate into market? [00:35:22] S0: Yeah. So I'll give you a perspective on the overall markets, right? So we basically say if the market's down zero to 10, we don't care. We're an infinite live portfolio. Zero to 10% is like normal stuff. The way that I approach it with young analysts, I'm like, if something's on sale for 10%, do you rush out to the store to buy it? And they're like, well, not, No. Not really. I'm like, what about 20%? And they're like, I'd think about it. Maybe. 30%? Yeah. Probably. 40%? For sure. And so we think about declines in the market in sort of 10% increments. And we have liquidity set up in such a way that we could allocate sort of, like, every 10 percentage points down. We don't really worry about zero to 10%. [00:36:07] S1: How do you think about catching a falling knife? Let's make this real. I've done that before. I've looked at your Wix or your monday.com, which were down impressively large amounts. I love the founders. And, dude, I just determined that I couldn't determine baby from bathwater and did nothing. But do they had another 10, 20, 30% to drop?