Business Breakdowns
· Krishna Mohanraj
[00:00:00] S1: Perhaps it's worth talking about Stellantis, CNHI and IVECO together because they all came from the conglomerate. They're all in their own ways cyclical, capital intensive. They are all in some phase of a turnaround with challenged end markets. IVECO is a little bit different because of their defense exposure. With Stellantis, it is the product of a mega merger between Fiat Chrysler and Peugeot. Marchionne, in a very famous presentation a long time ago, talked about essentially the over-capitalization of the auto industry. And one of the biggest themes for Fiat was to reduce that by consolidation in the industry. So Stellantis is a product of that. It is definitely a car company, there's no question about that. And the market says that clearly. If you think about the multiples and the troubles that they've seen over the last few years, it is a difficult business. They've done their best to make the transition to EV. They have done their best to address the overcapacity, but essentially it is very clear that it's trouble. You can see that from the multiple. The valuation is undemanding. From a portfolio perspective, the exposure as a percentage of assets for Exor is about 10%. It's quite low compared to the historic exposures. Then you have CNHI, which again came from the old Fiat conglomerate. It is the more cyclical on-highway trucks business, was spun out as IVECO. And the Ag equipment business, which is a more higher quality, less cyclical business, became CNHI. They are the number two global player in that space after John Deere. A lot has happened at CNHI over the last three, four years to simplify the company, invest in technology. But again it is facing a cyclical low in its end markets, still a work in progress. We have a new CEO who's actually an insider from IVECO. For a very high quality business, the valuation is not demanding. It's another asset to look out for in the coming years. And then on IVECO, it's a global maker of commercial trucks, buses, defense vehicles spun off in 2022. The interesting thing is they're trying to separate out the defense business as a spinoff or a sale. And as you can imagine right now there is a lot of pent-up demand for anything in the defense sector. There is also chatter on M&A for the core business as well, including some potential conversations with the Indian company Tata Motors.
· Krishna Mohanraj, Zack Fuss
A lot more current news around IVECO, but it is a smaller stake for them in terms of share of NAV. If you look at the three businesses, I would say they're reasonable to cheaply valued businesses facing both idiosyncratic and weak end markets. From a portfolio standpoint, it feels like you're getting assets which are fairly undervalued. And we will talk about the NAV as a whole and what the stock trades as a discount to NAV, but in the underlying NAV, with the exception of Ferrari, I wouldn't call any of the other listed companies as overly valued. [00:00:00] S0: To round out the conversation on the listed companies and we'll dive deeper into some of them. I know we have left Juventus, Clarivate and then Philips, which I want to set aside just given the continued interest there. But Juventus probably takes more mindshare than it really does economic share, just given how high profile sports are today, but somewhat of an immaterial stake for them. And then Clarivate, which is an interesting one given that has very significantly underperformed as a listed company. But just curious how those assets came to be part of the portfolio and the varying degrees of importance and support for their broader capital allocation strategy.
· Krishna Mohanraj
[00:00:00] S1: If you start with Juventus, I have a lot of positive things to say about capital allocation in general, but Juventus always raises some eyebrows. It is a storied asset. Over the long term, it seems to be worth a lot more than at least recent troubles and valuations would suggest. But you have to definitely ask the question economically, does it move the needle in terms of Exor's chosen metric, NAV per share? It is definitely a quote unquote legacy asset. I can't find a better word for it. And you have to ask why they need to own a stake in a football club with a very checkered recent history, not just in performance, but also in terms of corporate governance scandals. The entire board, including the president, had to resign. The president was an Agnelli. To add to everything, this is clearly a family passion. Football and the family's relationship with Juventus goes back generations, so it's a tiny part of asset value. So a fair question is, why bother? Isn't it just a headache that takes away from what is really crucial for NAV per share growth? And the only possible reason it's in the portfolio is because it's a family passion. So it is what it is. Clarivate is a lot more interesting. Clarivate is an analytics company spun off from Thomson Reuters. They serve the academic market, the scientific market, life sciences, intellectual property assets around it. It's a subscription business. It provides things like literature reviews, competitive intelligence, data on patents, trademarks, et cetera. Now, if you think about where Exor is thinking about going in the future, in places like healthcare technology, Clarivate not only is an interesting investment in itself, but it provides one of the building blocks, I think, for them in that ecosystem where they want to step into the future. We will talk about Philips and Institut, bioMérieux, other investments in that space, and they all seem to kind of fall in that bucket. So it is quite an interesting investment in the context of the portfolio and where they want to take the portfolio.
· Zack Fuss
[00:00:00] S0: I think this is maybe a good point to check in on broadly valuation here. What's always striking about these publicly listed holding companies is when they trade at such a significant discount to what the listed constituents would support on valuation. And then of course, this is a business that also has investments that are not listed, which we'll discuss in some level of detail. But what is the setup here as it relates to their published NAV and the listed interests and the way that the stock trades, and then further, how they are making efforts to close that discount to NAV in a way that are material?
· Krishna Mohanraj
[00:00:00] S1: The mechanics of the valuation is super simple. The asset base is dominated by publicly listed companies. A full 70% of assets is listed. You have a market price for them. You can make reasonable assumptions on the private assets based on disclosures, subtract net debt, and you end up with a reasonable estimate of spot NAV. You don't need to be too precise here because the stock trades at a big discount to this NAV, anywhere from 50 to 60% depending on your assumptions, and you're going to find the discount quite attractive. So the mechanics of the valuation itself is pretty straightforward, but you have some big questions. The big question is the underlying assets, both the listed ones and the unlisted ones, what are the true valuations for them? But also, what should the discount be? What should the NAV discount be for a publicly listed holding company like this? So, starting with the first question, if you look at the big four public assets—Ferrari, Stellantis, CNHI, Philips—Ferrari is of course a unique asset. We said that it's an exceptional business, but it trades at a steep multiple and they seem willing to trim at these prices. So that's something to think about. The other three are all global businesses—Stellantis, CNHI, Philips—each facing a difficult business cycle and in the midst of turnarounds. None of them are trading at steep multiples. So if I put all of these together, I would say all in, you're getting a diverse mix of global businesses at reasonable prices. Now, to the NAV discount, I think it's interesting to see what the market is saying now. Having a NAV discount is part and parcel of being a holding company. There's no getting away from it. Having said that, in the case of Exor, that discount has been unusually high for a very long period of time. So why is that discount high? The market, of course, loves companies that are doing unique things and are exceptional at them. Ferrari, of course, Hermès would be another example. But if you think about it, a holding company is the exact opposite of a pure play exceptional business. I would say the NAV tells you the asset value of today, but for a holding company, it's hard to tell where it would be in five years from now. And it appears the market is saying they don't believe that they can maintain that NAV per share growth like in the recent past.
· Krishna Mohanraj
The NAV growth at Exor in the last three, four years, even longer, has all come from Ferrari. If you remove Ferrari, this ends up being an odd collection of turnarounds in markets that have both cyclical and structural headwinds. And then you have this collection managed by a third party who acts with a time horizon that might be much, much longer than what most market participants want. So why bother when you can own Ferrari directly if you want an exceptional company at a steep multiple, or if you want to play value on Philips or CNHI selectively, depending on your conviction? So that is the debate, really, and it's a fair debate. In all this, what I like is how pragmatic Elkann is when he talks about the discount. Not defensive, not complaining that the market is wrong, but I think correctly recognizing that the discount is an amazing opportunity for them, an opportunity for Exor to invest in themselves, to invest in something that they know very well, and buy back their own stock. The decision this year to trim Ferrari to buy back stock raised some eyebrows but was an excellent one in this context because it allowed them to buy back stock at very steep discounts to NAV. As an investor, if you need to be in this, you need to have a long time horizon and you need to believe that there is alignment between Elkann and the minority shareholders. Over time you will see NAV per share growth. You shouldn't be in it hoping for a narrowing of the discount because that is not in management's control.