00:19:01 · Joe Weisenthal, James Bosworth
[00:19:01] S1: So one of the things that I read in your newsletter, which I hadn't clicked is that or hadn't really thought of before, is that there had been a lot of criticism in Brazil and around the world towards Lula. For having been too friendly with Maduro. But you sort of flip the sides again. It's like, all right, Delcy, part of Maduro's party, kind of chummy with Trump. Maybe that allows Lula to create some space, maybe becomes an advocate for some sort of version of Venezuelan democracy. Talk to us about that link. [00:19:35] S2: So there's an element in which Lula has called for new elections in Venezuela, and he was way too friendly with Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro and various other left-wing dictators across the hemisphere. He has been for much of his career. He can't be happy with how things are going in Venezuela, right? South America is Brazil's sphere of influence. And right now, Trump is treating Venezuela like a proxy colony in some ways. And so I think that Lula would like to see Some sort of independence by Venezuela from the U.S. [00:20:07] S1: Authorities. [00:20:08] S2: And he thinks that a new election would potentially benefit him in that way, whether or not that election goes left or center. That said, the Venezuelan opposition hates Lula. They blamed Lula for a lot of what went wrong, the reason that they were not able to get a transition over the years. And so it's unlikely you'd see a Machado-Lula hug fest and that they get along. But they could become quiet allies of each other in this quest to push Venezuela towards elections.
00:20:08 · James Bosworth, Tracy Alloway
[00:20:08] S2: And he thinks that a new election would potentially benefit him in that way, whether or not that election goes left or center. That said, the Venezuelan opposition hates Lula. They blamed Lula for a lot of what went wrong, the reason that they were not able to get a transition over the years. And so it's unlikely you'd see a Machado-Lula hug fest and that they get along. But they could become quiet allies of each other in this quest to push Venezuela towards elections. [00:20:35] S0: Wait, can you just explain what influence exactly Brazil has over Venezuela or what leverage they actually exert here?
00:20:35 · Tracy Alloway, James Bosworth
[00:20:35] S0: Wait, can you just explain what influence exactly Brazil has over Venezuela or what leverage they actually exert here? [00:20:43] S2: That's a great question. So Lula... Brazil is Latin America's largest economy. It shares a border with Venezuela. Hypothetically, for years under Chavez and Maduro, there were tens of millions of development contracts that went from Brazil to Venezuela. And Brazil's construction companies constructed a bunch of Venezuelan infrastructure. Brazil should be influential in Venezuela. The fact that they haven't been is the surprise. They are the biggest military in South America. They're the biggest neighbor for Venezuela. They're the largest economy. They should be the most influential player in South America in Venezuela. But under Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil stepped back from a lot of the diplomatic efforts to push transition. And then under Lula, they did very little after Maduro stole the 2024 election. Both the right and the left in Brazil have taken that step back from what should be influence in South America. And I think Lula may want to reassert it because as presidents late in their second term often do, when they become lame ducks, they turn towards foreign policy because it's where they have the influence.
00:20:43 · James Bosworth, Joe Weisenthal
[00:20:43] S2: That's a great question. So Lula... Brazil is Latin America's largest economy. It shares a border with Venezuela. Hypothetically, for years under Chavez and Maduro, there were tens of millions of development contracts that went from Brazil to Venezuela. And Brazil's construction companies constructed a bunch of Venezuelan infrastructure. Brazil should be influential in Venezuela. The fact that they haven't been is the surprise. They are the biggest military in South America. They're the biggest neighbor for Venezuela. They're the largest economy. They should be the most influential player in South America in Venezuela. But under Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil stepped back from a lot of the diplomatic efforts to push transition. And then under Lula, they did very little after Maduro stole the 2024 election. Both the right and the left in Brazil have taken that step back from what should be influence in South America. And I think Lula may want to reassert it because as presidents late in their second term often do, when they become lame ducks, they turn towards foreign policy because it's where they have the influence. [00:22:06] S1: Setting aside democracy and all that, what's happening with oil and the corporate money? And is there evidence of the oil majors, et cetera, actually looking at Venezuela as a real opportunity for growth? Or is the story still that all the talented petroleum engineers left a long time ago, the infrastructure isn't in place, it's still too uncertain, it's mostly noise? Where do you stand on that?
00:22:29 · James Bosworth, Tracy Alloway
[00:22:29] S2: The oil majors are looking, but they're not jumping it. Chevron is in. Chevron was in before. Chevron will be in for the next 50 years. The rest of the oil majors, including Exxon and Conoco, who were kicked out under the Chavez era, they're interested. Venezuela is a sea of oil. It would be a great place to go. None of the larger firms want to go into Venezuela prior to some sort of certainty that their contracts will be respected. And so what you see instead are the NABAP, which is the company that Alejandro Betancourt currently runs, the companies that are going in are small. They're not quite wildcatters, but they are the sort of companies that aren't there for the long run. They're there for the quick deals. And I think that as we look for, you know, how is Venezuela going to recover? How is Venezuela going to rebuild? You're not going to rebuild with a company that has never done serious oil drilling elsewhere in the world. And so one of the reasons to push for democracy in Venezuela is the fact that you do not get the oil majors to come in until they have that rule of law certainty. And they know that a 10-year investment or a 30-year investment is going to be able to stick and not just change two years from now when the government changes. [00:23:39] S0: Speaking of rule of law, I mentioned that headline that came out just before we started recording this, but the New York Times reporting that the U.S. is in negotiations for a potential military presence in Venezuela. What does that actually mean?
00:23:39 · Tracy Alloway, James Bosworth, Joe Weisenthal
[00:23:39] S0: Speaking of rule of law, I mentioned that headline that came out just before we started recording this, but the New York Times reporting that the U.S. is in negotiations for a potential military presence in Venezuela. What does that actually mean? [00:23:53] S2: So as I understand it, it's a status of forces agreement, which doesn't necessarily mean a permanent military base or military presence. Instead, it would be an agreement for the U.S. military to be there to train, to operate, to provide support, and maybe to engage in certain operations. There was just an operation a couple of days ago against an ELN camp near the Colombia border. It looks like the U.S. assisted the Venezuelan military in that. The U.S. wants these agreements so that we have legal certainty for what happens to the U.S. soldiers when they are in country. And the Trump administration would like that deal signed so that we can feel more comfortable having U.S. military presence in the region. But it doesn't mean like a permanent base by any means. At least that's not how I read it. They could change that tomorrow. But how I read it today is just a basic agreement. [00:24:38] S1: What would happen if there were a free election held tomorrow in Venezuela? [00:24:41] S2: María Corina Machado would win. [00:24:43] S1: Unambiguously?